The brain as a cathedral
Steven Mithen’s The Prehistory of the Mind: A Search for the Origins of Art, Science and Religion is an ambitious and engaging exploration of the evolution of human intelligence. Drawing on archaeology, psychology, anthropology, linguistics and primatology, Mithen attempts to explain how the human mind acquired the remarkable flexibility that distinguishes modern human behaviour. His central argument is that the modern mind did not emerge simply through the gradual enlargement of the brain, but through the development and eventual integration of specialised forms of intelligence. This process, which he refers to as “cognitive fluidity”, enabled humans to think creatively, develop symbolic culture and construct increasingly sophisticated understandings of the world.
Mithen begins by questioning why the dramatic expansion of the human brain was not accompanied by an equally dramatic increase in technological and cultural complexity. Although early humans possessed brains approaching modern dimensions, the archaeological record suggests that their material culture remained relatively limited for long periods. How, then, did modern human intelligence arise, and why did art, religion and complex technology appear so much later? These questions provide the framework for a book that seeks to reconstruct the evolutionary history of the mind from the earliest primates to the emergence of modern human behaviour.
The foundation of Mithen’s argument is his proposed architecture of the mind. Drawing on contemporary theories of modularity and multiple intelligences, he suggests that the human mind developed through successive stages. Initially, intelligence was largely general-purpose, allowing early hominins to learn from experience and respond flexibly to their surroundings. Subsequently, specialised cognitive domains evolved, each adapted to particular tasks. Mithen identifies four principal domains: social intelligence, concerned with understanding other individuals; technical intelligence, associated with tool-making; natural history intelligence, concerned with animals, plants and the environment; and linguistic intelligence.
The central issue was that these domains initially operated in relative isolation. Early humans could become increasingly proficient at making tools, understanding animal behaviour and negotiating social relationships, but they could not readily combine knowledge from different areas. Mithen illustrates this condition through an architectural analogy, comparing the mind to a cathedral. In its earlier form, the cathedral contains separate chapels divided by substantial walls. Each chapel represents a specialised intelligence, while the central nave represents general intelligence. Only when connections develop between these previously isolated domains can information flow freely throughout the mind.
This integration, or cognitive fluidity, is the key to Mithen’s explanation of modern human behaviour. Once technical, social and natural history intelligence could interact, humans became capable of applying knowledge in new and creative ways. They could use their understanding of animals to design specialised hunting weapons, employ natural objects as symbols, and develop imaginative representations of the relationship between humanity and the natural world. Mithen argues that this transformation provided the cognitive foundations for art, religion, science and the increasingly complex technologies associated with modern humans.
One of the book’s features is its use of archaeological evidence to investigate otherwise inaccessible aspects of prehistoric cognition. Mithen examines the development of stone tools, from the relatively simple Oldowan industry to the more sophisticated hand-axes and Levallois techniques. He argues that the relative uniformity of early tool traditions reflects the limitations imposed by isolated cognitive domains. Although early humans possessed considerable technical abilities, they were unable to integrate these with their knowledge of animal behaviour and social relationships in the manner of modern humans.
The discussion of Neanderthals is particularly significant. Mithen recognises their considerable intelligence, technological competence and capacity to survive in challenging environments, but suggests that their specialised intelligences remained insufficiently integrated. Their apparent lack of elaborate symbolic culture is therefore interpreted not as evidence of general intellectual inferiority, but as the consequence of a different mental architecture. This is an interesting argument, challenging conventional assumptions about the relationship between brain size, intelligence, and technological sophistication.
Mithen’s treatment of art and religion is also compelling. He argues that the emergence of visual symbolism required the integration of technical abilities to create images, social intelligence to communicate meaning, and natural history intelligence to understand the relationship between representations and the world. The appearance of cave paintings, personal ornaments and anthropomorphic figures is therefore interpreted as evidence of cognitive fluidity. Religion, in particular, becomes understandable as a consequence of the ability to combine different kinds of knowledge, allowing animals, people and natural phenomena to acquire symbolic and supernatural significance.
The book also considers the development of language. Mithen follows anthropologist Robin Dunbar in suggesting that early language initially evolved primarily for social communication, helping individuals maintain relationships within increasingly large groups. Over time, information about the natural and technical worlds entered this social domain. Language thereby became a means of connecting previously isolated intelligences, enabling individuals to discuss matters beyond their immediate experience and to reflect upon their own knowledge.
Another strength of The Prehistory of the Mind is its accessibility. Mithen presents complex theoretical arguments through engaging analogies, particularly the cathedral model, and his dramatic reconstruction of prehistory as a play in successive acts. These devices make an otherwise demanding subject understandable to the non-specialist without sacrificing the intellectual ambition of the work. His interdisciplinary approach also demonstrates the considerable potential of cognitive archaeology to investigate questions that cannot be answered through the fossil record alone.
Nevertheless, the book has some important weaknesses. Mithen’s reconstruction of prehistoric mental architecture is necessarily speculative. Archaeological artefacts provide evidence of behaviour, but they cannot directly reveal the cognitive processes that produced them. The absence of particular artefacts does not necessarily demonstrate an inability to conceive of them, and technological traditions may reflect environmental conditions, available materials, social practices or the preservation of archaeological evidence rather than limitations in intelligence.
This problem is especially apparent in Mithen’s explanation for the apparent absence of bone, antler and ivory tools among earlier humans. His suggestion that specialised cognitive domains prevented the integration of knowledge about animal materials with technical intelligence is intriguing, but it is difficult to demonstrate. Organic tools may simply have been less likely to survive in the archaeological record. Similarly, the relationship between cognitive fluidity and the emergence of art and religion remains a plausible interpretation rather than an established evolutionary mechanism.
Mithen’s original chronology also requires qualification. His 1996 account placed the emergence of modern human behaviour relatively late, particularly in relation to the archaeological evidence then available from Europe. Subsequent discoveries and reinterpretations have demonstrated that important aspects of symbolic behaviour and technological innovation appeared much earlier in Africa. Mithen subsequently accepted an earlier emergence of cognitive fluidity, predating the dispersal of modern humans from Africa. This revision does not invalidate his central argument, but it illustrates the importance of distinguishing the broader theoretical framework from the particular chronological reconstruction presented in the original book.
There is also a question over whether the development of specialised intelligences necessarily required the degree of isolation Mithen proposes. The evidence for sophisticated social behaviour, tool use and environmental knowledge among non-human primates suggests that cognitive abilities may interact in more complex ways than his model allows. Nevertheless, the possibility that modern human cognition depends upon extensive connections between different domains remains an important hypothesis.
The Prehistory of the Mind is an important contribution to the study of human evolution. Its central achievement is to shift attention away from brain size and technological complexity alone, towards the organisation of the mind and the relationships between different forms of intelligence. Mithen provides a compelling explanation for why modern human behaviour may have emerged through changes in cognitive organisation rather than through a simple increase in intellectual capacity.
Although some of his interpretations remain speculative, the book’s interdisciplinary approach, accessible presentation and emphasis on cognitive fluidity make it a valuable work for anyone interested in the origins of human intelligence. Its greatest contribution is to demonstrate that the evolution of the human mind cannot be understood simply by examining what prehistoric humans made, but requires us to consider how they might have thought.